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Abstract — In 2000, Hwang and Li proposed a new remote 
user authentication scheme using smart cards. Chan and 
Chang showed that the masquerade attack is successful on 
this scheme. Recently Shen, Lin and Hwang pointed out a 
different type of attack on this scheme and presented a 
modified scheme to remove these defects. . Further in 2003, 
Leung et al showed that this modified scheme is still 
vulnerable to the attack proposed by Chan and Cheng. In 
addition they showed that the extended attack proposed by 
Chang and Hwang also works well. Recently Kumar have 
suggested the idea of check digits to overcome the above 
attacks. In this paper we present a new scheme by using check 
digits which also overcomes these attacks and is more efficient 
than Kumar’s scheme. 1
Index Terms — Authentication, cryptography, security, 
cryptanalysis, smart cards.
I. INTRODUCTION
N  1993, Chang and Wu [5] introduced Remote password 
authentication scheme with smart cards. A number of remote 
password authentication schemes with smart cards have been 
proposed since then. These schemes allow a valid user to login 
a remote server and access the services provided by the remote 
server.
In 2000, Hwang and Li [7] proposed a new remote user 
authentication scheme using smart cards, which was based on 
ElGamal’s cryptosystem. Chan and Cheng [2] made a 
cryptanalysis of  Hwang and Li’s Scheme and pointed out that 
a legitimate user can easily create a valid pair of (IDj , PWj ) 
without knowing the secrete key of the system ‘xs’.
Later, Shen, Lin and Hwang [10] showed that a legitimate 
user can masquerade as another user. The user can compute 
some other user’s password. They also proposed a modified 
scheme to patch up both ‘Chen and Chang’s attack’ and their 
own attack. In the same year, Chang and Hwang [4] proposed 
an extended attack to solve the problem of Chan and Cheng’s 
attack on Hwang and Li’s authentication scheme.
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Further Leung et al [9] showed that weakness still exists in 
Shen, Lin and Hwang’s scheme. By using similar attack of 
Cheng’ attack or Chang and Hwang‘s attack a legitimate user 
can still impersonate other legal users to login a remote server.
Recently Kumar [8] suggested the idea of check digits to 
repair the Shen et al’s scheme, which successfully removes the 
threats devised by Leung et al. In the same year Awasthi and 
Lal [1] also proposed a scheme which also removes these 
threats successfully. 
In this paper we propose a new remote user authentication 
scheme, which is more efficient than Kumar’s scheme in terms 
of computational cost. 
II. REVIEW OF THE HWNAG-LI SCHEME
In this section, we briefly review Hwang-Li scheme [5]. 
This scheme is composed of the initial phase, registration 
phase, the login phase and the authentication phase. Whenever 
a user registers itself through registration phase, the server 
identifies the user and issues a password and a smartcard, 
holding related information, through a secure channel. To 
access the remote server, user inserts its smart card in to the 
device and keys the password. The server authenticates the 
user in authentication phase.  Different phases work as 
follows:
A. Initial Phase
The System Administrator (SA) generates the following 
parameters
p : a large prime number
h (.) : a one-way function
xs : a secret key of  the system
B. Registration Phase
A user Ui who wants to register itself for accessing server 
services, submits it’s IDi to the SA. SA computes PWi as 
             PWi = IDi
xs mod p, 
       Registration center issues a password PWi and a smart 
card, which contains the public parameters (h (.), p ).
C. Login Phase
User Ui inserts its smart-card and provides IDi and PWi. 
The smart card then does the following: 
1. Generate a random number r.
2. Compute  C1=  IDi
 r  mod p. 
3. Compute  t = h (T ⊕ PWi ) mod p –1, where T  is the 
current time stamp.
4. Compute  M = IDi
t mod p. 
5. Compute  C2= M (PWi )
r  mod p. 
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6. Sends a message C = (IDi , C1, C2, T ) to the remote 
system.
D. Authentication Phase
The system receives the message C at time T’, where T’ is 
the current time of system. Then the system does the following 
steps:
1. Test the validity of IDi.
2. Test the validity of time interval between T and T ’.
3. Check whether the following equation holds:
C2(C1
xs)-1 = (IDi )
h (T ⊕ PWi )   mod p.
It is difficult for user Ui to compute the secret key xs of the 
system from the equation: 
PWi = IDi
xs mod p.
III. ATTACKS ON HWNAG-LI SCHEME
A. Chan-Cheng’s attack
According to this attack a legitimate user can easily create a 
valid pair of (IDj , PWj ) without knowing the secrete key of 
the system ‘xs’.
Suppose Bob is a legal user with a pair of (IDb , PWb ) and 
he wants to create a valid pair of (IDj , PWj ) such that it
satisfies
PWj = IDj
xs  mod p.
He first computes IDj by
                 IDj = (IDb ∗IDb )  mod p.
Then, he can computes PWj as follow:
               PWj = IDj
xs  mod p = (PWb ∗PWb )  mod p
As a result, Bob can create a valid pair of (IDf , PWf ) without 
knowing the secrete key xs . 
B. Shen-Lin-Hwang’s  attack
According to this attack a legitimate user who wants to 
masquerade as another user Uk  may  login a remote server and 
gain access. 
Suppose Bob wants  to masquerade as another user Uk. He
first computes IDb by
                 IDb = IDk
r  mod p, 
where r is a random number such that gcd(r, p) = 1.
Then, he submits his IDb to register with the remote server. SA
will verify identity and provide a smart card and password
PWb = IDb
xs  mod p.
Now Bob can compute PWk as follow:
               PWk = IDk
xs  mod p =  PWb
-r  mod p
As a result, Bob can successfully use user Uk’s password to 
masquerade as the user Uk to login the remote server.
C. Chang and Hwang’s attack
Chang and Hwang pointed out that the Chan and Cheng’s 
attack is not always success. Chan and Cheng did not consider 
the validity checking of IDi in the authentication phase of 
Hwang and Li’s scheme and cannot guarantee that the specific 
format of the user identity always satisfies the square of a 
legitimate identity, that is, IDi mod p [3]. Chan and Hwang 
also designed two attack mechanisms to obtain a valid identity 
which is based on Chan and Chang’s one.
I-Mechanism 
Following Chan and Chang’ equation
         IDj = (IDb ∗IDb )  mod p.
is modified to:
               IDj = (IDb)
r   mod p.
where r is an arbitrary integer and the corresponding password 
can be obtained by:
               PWj = (PWb)
r   mod p.
If IDb is primitive element of the modulus p, any valid 
identity IDj as well as its password can be computed. And now 
any intruder with identity IDj successfully passes the validity 
check for identity in Hwang and Li’s scheme.
II-Mechanism 
Several intruders may cooperate to get a valid identity IDj as 
well as its corresponding password PWj as follows
               IDj = ∏ IDb  mod p.
Suppose identity fulfills the required format, its corresponding 
password can be obtained by:
               PWj = (IDj)
xs   mod p.
   = ∏ PWb   mod p.
IV. SHEN-LIN-HWANG’S MODIFICATION
Shen, Lin and Hwang proposed a modified scheme in [7]. 
They suggested that instead of an identity a shadow identity 
will be given to the legal user. The scheme has the just hiding 
of identities to prevent from the forgery attack [section III-B, 
III-C]. The steps in login and authentication phase are not 
changed except IDi is replaced by SIDi. The modified 
registration phase is as follows:
User Ui submits his IDi to the remote server for registration. 
The remote server computes the pair (SIDi, PWi) as follows:
SIDi = Red(IDi)
                PWi = (SIDi)
xs   mod p.
Where Red(.) is a shadow function, such that user cannot 
compute IDi  having the knowledge of SIDi  and Red(.). The 
shadow function is only maintained in the remote server. SIDi
is user’s shadow identity which is made public instead of IDi. 
Registration center issues a shadow identity SIDi , a password 
PWi and a smart card, which contains the public parameters (h
(.), p ). In login phase and authentication phase each IDi is 
replaced with SIDi. Login and authentication processes remain 
same. Now message C coming to server through login page is 
(SIDi , C1, C2, T ) instead of (IDi , C1, C2, T ).
According to Shen et al., Though shadow identity of IDi is 
known, shadow identity of  IDb = IDk
r  mod p (or IDb = IDk*
IDk  mod p ) can not be computed. That is why this scheme is 
secure.
V. LEUNG-CHENG-FONG-CHAN’S OBJECTION 
Leung, Cheng, Fong and Chan pointed out that although 
Shen et al. defend the attack of registration of a new IDj via IDi
from a legal user Ui, the scheme can not withstand attack that 
similar to Chan and Cheng’s attack and Chang and Hwang’s 
attack in authentication phase. 
According to Leung et al, shadow identity does not enhance 
the security in authentication phase and hence intruder can still 
login to the remote system by having a pair (SIDj , PWj). 
Attack works as follows:
Replace IDj with SIDj in Chang and Hwang’s attack 
(mechanism-I), we get
SIDj = (SIDb)
r   mod p.
where r is an arbitrary integer and the corresponding password 
can be obtained by:
               PWj  = (SIDj)
xs   mod p.
= [(SIDb)
r ]
xs   mod p.
    = (PWb)
r   mod p.
This shows that a legitimate user ui can impersonate other 
legal user with valid pair (SIDj , PWj) to login the remote 
server.  Note SIDb is primitive element of the modulus p, any 
valid shadow identity SIDj as well as its password can be 
computed. Similarly, chan-cheng’s attack works fine.
VI. REVIEW OF THE KUMAR’S SCHEME
In this section, we briefly review Kumar’s scheme [8]. This 
scheme is composed of the initial phase, registration phase, the 
login phase and the authentication phase. 
This scheme is the modified form of the Shen- Lin-
Hwang’s scheme and uses one more function CK to generate 
the check digit [6] for each registered identity. In this scheme, 
only the AS can generate a valid identity and the corresponding 
check digit. 
A.  Initialization Phase
In this phase, the AS generates the following parameters
P : a large prime number.
f : a one-way function.
xs: a secret key of  the system, which is only possessed  with 
the AS.
Red (.): a “shadowed” identity of the device which is only
possessed with the AS.
CK (.): a one way secure check digit function, which is used 
to generate unique check digit for the registered identity,
and also is possessed with the AS Only.
B. Registration Phase
Assume that this phase is executed over a secure channel.  
User U submits her/his identity string IDi to the AS. The string 
IDi consists of the name of the user and a unique identification 
number etc, which are unique for the user U. Then, AS
computes the following:
SID = Red (IDi), CID =  CK  (SID)  and  PW =( SID) 
xs  mod p.
Furthermore, the AS distributes the smart card and  (SID??ID
, PW) to the user U in a secure way (say physically). The smart 
card contains the public parameters (f, p).
C.  Login Phase
The user U attaches her/his smart card to the smart card 
reader at any time T and keys her/his identity SID??ID and 
password PW. The smart card conducts the following 
computations:
1. Generate a random number r.
2. Computes C1= (SID)
 r mod p. 
3. Compute  t = f (T ⊕ PW ) mod p –1.
4. Compute  m = (SID)
t mod  p. 
5. Compute  C2= m (PW )
r  mod  p. 
6. Sends a message LR = (SID?CID , C1, C2, T ) to the AS.
D.  Authentication Phase
Assume that the AS receives the login request LR at time Tc. 
Then, AS does the following computations to check the 
validity of the login request LR.
1. Check the specific format of SID. If the format of the SID 
is incorrect, then AS rejects the login request LR. 
2. Check, whether the condition CID = CK (SID) holds, if 
not, then AS rejects the login request LR.
3. Check, whether Tc – T ≤ ∆T, where ∆T is the legal time 
interval due to transmission delay, if not, then AS rejects 
the login request LR.
4. Check, if C2
?
=  (C1
xs)(SID) 
f (T ⊕ PW) mod p, then the AS
accepts the login request. Otherwise, the login request 
will be rejected by AS.
VII. A NEW REMOTE USER AUTHENTICATION SCHEME
USING SMART CARDS WITH CHECK DIGITS
In this section, we propose our new remote user 
authentication scheme. This scheme is also composed of the 
initial phase, registration phase, the login phase and the 
authentication phase. 
This scheme is the modified form of the Hwnag-Li’s scheme 
and uses one more function CK to generate the check digit [8] 
for each registered identity. In this scheme, only the AS can 
generate a valid identity and the corresponding check digit. 
A. Initialization Phase
The System Administrator (SA) generates the following 
parameters
p : a large prime number
f (.) : A one-way function
xs : a secret key of  the system
CK(.): :a “function” to generate check digit for the 
registered identity, which is only possessed with the AS.
B.  Registration Phase
A user Ui who wants to register itself for accessing server 
services, submits it’s IDi to the SA. SA assigns a unique 
registration number R and computes PWi as 
PWi = (IDi⊕ R)
xs mod p,
CID =  CK  (IDi⊕ R)
       Registration center issues a password PWi and a smart 
card, which contains the public parameters (h (.), p, R, CID ).
C.  Login Phase
The user U attaches its smart card to the smart card reader at 
any time T and keys the identity IDi and password PWi. The 
smart card computes as foloowing:
1. Generate a random number r.
2. Computes C1= (IDi⊕ R)
 r mod p. 
3. Compute  t = f (T ⊕ PWi ) mod p –1.
4. Compute  m = (IDi)
t mod  p. 
5. Compute  C2= m (PWi)
r  mod  p. 
6. Sends a message C = (IDi , R, CID , C1, C2, T ) to the 
AS.
D.  Authentication Phase
The system receives the message C at time T’, where T’ is 
the current time of system. Then the system does the following 
steps:
1. Test the validity of IDi.
2. Checks CID = CK  (IDi⊕ R) , if true then proceed else 
reject the request. 
3. Test the validity of time interval between T and T ’, in 
case of invalid time interval give an appropriate message and 
stop the protocol.
4. Check whether the following equation holds:
C2(C1
xs)-1 = (IDi )
h (T ⊕ PWi )   mod p.
VIII. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE SCHEME
In this section, we shall only discuss the enhanced security 
features. Rests are the same as original schemes in literature.
A. Chan- Cheng’s attack and Chang- Hwang’s Attack
The security explanation is very similar to Kumar’s 
discussion. The functionality of the CK (.) blocks the attacks 
via authentication phase as in Chan- Cheng’s attack and 
Chang- Hwang’s Attack. Assume, Alice chooses a R’ such that 
IDb ⊕ R’ = (IDi ⊕  R)
k
 mod p, where k is a random number. 
Then, he can compute the corresponding password
PWb = PWi
k mod p.
But, this result is incomplete; still, it is essential to obtain 
the check digit corresponding to IDb. In the proposed scheme 
only the SA can generate the check digit corresponding to IDb
and R’. As a result, a legal user IDi cannot compute a valid 
pair of identity and password for the other user IDb to login at 
the server. Thus, Chang- Hwang’s Attack will not work. As 
being the one of the case of this attack, Chan–Cheng’s attack 
also does not work.
A. Shen-Lin-Hwang’s  attack
The functionality of the assignment of registration number
blocks the masquerade attack via registration phase. Assume 
that an intruder intercepts the logon request C = (IDi, CID , C1, 
C2, Tc ) from  a public network and computes 
IDb =  (IDi)
k
mod p.
Now he submits this IDb to the SA for the registration. Upon 
receiving the registration request from IDb, the SA will reject 
the request because the format of IDb is incorrect. If in any 
case format holds, SA computes assigns a unique registration 
number r and computes a corresponding password PWb = (IDi
⊕ r )
xs mod p. With this PWb it is infeasible to compute PWi,
because R (Registration number of user Ui) and r (Registration 
number of user Ub corresponding to IDb) are predefined.
B. Leung-Cheng-Fong-Chan’s attack: is extension of Chan-
Cheng’s attack and Chan and Hwang’s attack. In this scheme 
we are not using shadow function so there is no need to discuss 
this attack.
IX. COMPARISON 
In this section we compare the computational cost of our
scheme with other schemes. Let us denote E as computational 
cost of an exponential operation, H as cost of hashing, M cost 
of multiplication, R is cost of redirection function (It is 
approximately hashing cost) and C as Check digit counting 
cost. Since R and C both functions are equivalent to hash 
function, we can not neglect their computational cost. Other 
costs are negligible or minor. Then following table shows the 
computational cost in various phases in terms of these costs.
Table 1. Comparison of some remote user authentication 
schemes .
Computation Cost
Schemes Registration
Phase
Login 
Phase
Authenticatio
n Phase
Security
in authentication 
and registration 
phases
Hwang-
Li 
Scheme
E
3E+H
+M
3E+H+M NIL
Shen et 
al’s 
scheme
R+E
3E+H
+M
3E+H+M NIL
Kumar’s 
Scheme
R+E+C
3E+H
+M
3E+H+M+C Yes
Proposed 
Scheme
E+C
3E+H
+M
3E+H+M+C Yes
Above table shows that our proposed scheme bears a less 
redirection cost in registration phase than Kumar’s scheme and 
holds similar security level.
X. COMPARISON 
This paper presents New Remote User Authentication 
Scheme Using Smart Cards with check digits. This scheme is 
more efficient than Kumar’s scheme. The proposed scheme is 
secure against the both types of attacks: attacks via registration 
phase and the attack via authentication phase. One enhanced 
feature of this scheme is that more than one user with same 
identity may register to the server.
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